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as the debt attends the person of the creditor. The question
having arisen prior to the adoption of the 14th Amendment, the Courts felt obliged to adopt this rule to protect the
natural rights of non-residents from the encroachments of the
several States. But the provision of the 14th Amendment, that no State shall deprive any person of property
without due process of law, affords the Courts an intelligible
and constitutional ground upon which to protect the rights
of non-resident creditors within the principles of Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.
CoNRAD RENo.
Boston.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

S preme Court of Massachusetts.
BROWN v. CUNARD S. S. CO.
A bill of lading provided, that "in the event of loss or damage for which
the ship is responsible, the liability shall not exceed the invoice, or the
declared value for the United States customs duty." The goods were damaged
to an amount less than the invoice value, but were worth, in their damaged
condition, the invoice value, plus the cost of importation. Held, that the
carrier was liable for the full actual damage.
AT the trial in the Superior Court, the amount of the damage, and the fault of the defendant which caused the damage,
were found as stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
The defendant, however, claimed that as the goods were still
worth their invoice value, which was the limit of the defendant's liability, no damage had been shown fof which it
could be held responsible under the bill of lading, and the
Superior Court ruled accordingly.

-rederic -Dodge, for plaintiff.
George -Putnamand Thomas lNussell, for defendant.
HOLMES, J. The plaintiff's goods were damaged on the
defendant's vessel, through its ficult, to the amount of $151.78,
in their market value in Boston, the port of destination, but
it did not appear that their market value, as damaged, was
less than the invoice value of the sound goods, with the cost
of importation added. The bill of lading limits the defend-
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ant's liability to the invoice value. See Graves v. Railroad
Co., 137 Mass. 33; Eill v. Railroad Co., 144 Id. 284. The
only question which we shall consider is whether the language
used exempts the defendant from all liability upon these facts.
The defendant relies upon some decisions to the effect that a
provision that the shipowner will not be liable for more than
the invoice value of the goods is to be construed as limiting
the liability in case of partial loss to the difference between
the net proceeds of each article damaged, and its invoice price
and freight, and that if the cargo owner "has received from
the sale of the damaged goods the invoice price, after deducting the cost of importation, sale, etc., the libel will be dismissed :" The Lydian Monarch,23 Fed. Rep. 298, 300; Pearse
v. Steamship Co., 24 Id. 285, 289. We shall not criticise these
decisions further than to say, that if they are not distinguishable from the case at bar we cannot follow them. The bill
of lading before us reads: "Ship not accountable for any sum
exceeding £100 per package, for goods of whatever description, unless the value is declared, and freight as may be
agreed paid thereon, and in event of loss or damage, for which
the ship is responsible, the liability shall not exceed the invoice, or the declared value for the United States customs
duty." It is plain that these words fix alternative limits of
liability; £100 per package, if the value is not declared;
the declared value, when it is declared. In the former case
we do not suppose that it would be contended that, if a pac4cage brought £100, no damage could be recovered, yet unless
the argument is carried to that extent we see no reason why,
in the latter alternative, the shipowners should escape if the
goods bring their invoice price. Looking at the words of
the latter branch of the sentence alone, it will be seen that
they refer to the "event of damage for which the ship is
responsible," and therefore in terms pre-suppose that something is to be recovered in the case for which they provide.
The following words, "the liability shall not exceed," etc.,
are apt words to express the outside limit of the sum to be
recovered, but both the particular words and the whole structure of the sentence are most inapt to express a stipulation
that if the goods are still equal to the invoice value, there
VOL. XXXVI.-81
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shall be no recovery at all. Even in the case of a valued
policy, which is much stronger than the one under consideration, the rule in most jurisdictions is to leave the valuation
entirely on one side for the purpose of determining what proportion of the valuation is to be paid by the insurers upon a
partial loss: Irving v. Manning, 1 H. L. Cas. 289, 306 ; Lewis
v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167; Bradlie v. Insurance Co., 12 Pet.
378, 399; Boardman v. Ins. Co., S. Jud. Ct. Mass., March 12,
1888. As we read the contract, the damages are to be ascertained in the usual way by finding the difference in value
between each package as damaged and the same undamaged,
and these damages are to be paid by the defendants, up to,
but not exceeding £100, when the value is not declared, or,
in this case, up to, but not exceeding, the invoice value. As
the damage to the plaintiff's walnuts did not exceed the
invoice value the defendant must pay the whole amount.
Judgment for plaintiff.
The right of a carrier to insert in
the bill of lading reasonable limitations both as to the circumstances
under which and the extent to which
lie will be liable, so that the risk he
incurs may not exceed what is justly
proportionate to the freight paid him,
is too well settled to call for discussion
here. The meaning, however, of such
a limitation as is found in the principal case, and its application when the
damage is partial only, deserve some
consideration.
The writer of this
note has found no cases bearing directly on the point, except The Lydian
Monarch, 23 Fed. R. 298, and Pearsev.
Quebec S. S. Co., 24 Id. 285. Both
these are cited in the principal case,
but the opinion does not state whether
this case is to be distinguished from
the two former, or stands opposed to
them on a question of law.
Whether any distinction can properly be taken between these cases,
depends on the meaning of the several
rwtive ziauses. In The Lydian
Monarch the words are, "the ship-

owner is not to be liable for any damage to the goods, * * * in any case

for more than the invoice or declared
value of the goods, whichever shall be
the least ;" in Pearsev. Quebec S. S.
Co., "in case of damages, loss or nondelivery, the shipowners will not be
liable for more than the invoice value
of the goods ;" and in the principal
case, "in event of loss or damage, for
which the ship is responsible, the liability shall not exceed the invoice, or
the declared value for the United
States customs duty."
In The Lydian Monarch, there is no
attempt to explain the language used,
but in Pearse v. Quebec S. S. Co. it is
construed not as a limitation of the
company's liability for loss or damage, but as a limitation of their liability for the particular goods lost or
damaged. In other words, the Court
in that case understand the carriers
as saying, not "we are liable for all
damage up to the amount of the invoice value of the goods," but, "we
are liable for damages, but no goods
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damaged shall be estimated to have
been worth more than their invoice
value. If this construction be correct, it is obvious that the rule adopted
for calculating damages in the principal case would not apply, but, as will
be shown below, it does not follow
that the Court was right in holding
further that in case of a damage as
distinguished from total loss, the liability was for the difference between
the net proceeds of the sale of the
damaged goods and their original invoice value, plus the freight, so that,
as was said in The Lydian Monarch, if
enough was realized from the sale to
cover the latter sum, there was no liability at all.
In the principal case, the clause is
held as a limitation of liability for loss
or damage, as indicating merely the
maximum that can be recovered on
this ground, and the judgment follows
logically from this construction.
If these restrictive clauses have been
rightly construed in each case, and
the contracts were not intended to be
of the same effect, then the principal
case is clearly distinguishable from
the others. The similarity of the language used in each case, however, and
the fact that such limitations of liability have been in use among carriers for many years would lead one to
suppose that there was one limitation
which was always understood to be
expressed by the words "the liability
shall not exceed the invoice value,"
or other words to that effect.
Now of the two possible constructions of such a clause, that adopted
in Pearsev. S. S. Co. seems not only
the better suited to the language there
under consideration, but the more reasonable construction for any restriction of the kind, because, in all such
cases, the amount of freight paid,
which is the consideration for the carrier's liability as well as for the car-
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riage, depends on the invoice value.
In the principal case, for instance, the
bill of lading excluded all liability
over £100 per package, "unless the
value is declared, and freight as may
be agreed paid thereon," i. e., proportionate to such value, and this was
done. It is only reasonable that the carrier's liability should be proportionate
to the freight received, and the language used in the principal case would
seem to admit of this construction, but
the Court's ruling is that the carrier
is liable for so much of the value of
the goods at the port of destination as
does not exceed their invoice or declared value. This would put the
shipper in a better position, relatively,
if the loss were under the invoice
value, than if it were over that
amount, and conversely the carrier
would have no inducement to preserve
any goods that should become damaged to an extent equal to their invoice value, for total loss would not
increase his liability.
Even in this view of the case, however, it does not follow that the measure of damages established in The Lydian Monarch and Pearse v. S. S. Co.
ought to have been adopted. In the
;atter case, this measure of damages
is inconsistent with the main part of
the decision. The respondents had
contended that the stipulation of the
bill of lading should be construed as
.imiting their responsibility to the invoice value of the shipment as a whole,
and that the carriers are not to be lia:ble for any loss or damage, provided
the shipper ultimately realizes at the
port of destination the whole invoice
value, as was the fact in that case.
To this the Court replied : "The limiting clause in this case must be construed as applying distributively upon
each article damaged, because that is
the most natural meaning of the
words, and best accords with the pre-
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sumed intention of the parties. The
clear intent was to provide not merely
for the loss of the whole shipment, or
for damage to the whole shipment, but
for the loss of any part and for damage to any part. When it is stipulated
that in case of damage or loss, the shipowner ' will not be liable for more than
the invoice value of the goods,' the
goods referred to are plainly the goods
damaged,.and those only, otherwise
the clause would not be valid. The
law makes the carrier liable for the
loss or damage of any goods through
his own negligence. Any stipulation
that would annul this liability is void.
* * * If the construction contended
for were the proper meaning of this
limiting clause, it would be void upon
grounds of public policy, as unreasonable, and as affording a direct encouragement to theft or non-delivery
of the shipper's goods; for on every
shipment, whether there was a loss or
not, the carrier might without accountability appropriate to his own use
enough of the owner's goods to reduce
the aggregate value of what remained
in the foreign market to the invoice
value of the whole, a result destructive of all commerce, because enabling
-the carrier to appropriate all the profits." All this would command the
-ssent of any reasonable man, but the
;Court goes on to say: "The net pro,ceeds of the sale of the damaged
:goods, over all charges and expenses,
if received by the owner, must theretfore go in diminution of the invoice
price and freight, and the carrier must
p-ay the difference. * * * If [quoting
from The Lydian Monarch] it shouldturn out that thelibellant has received
from the sale of the damaged goods
the invoice price, after deducting the
casts of importation, sale, etc., the
libel will be dismissed."
This method of measuring the
damages is wholly at variance with

what the Court said above: "The law
makes the carrier liable for the loss
or damage of any goods through his
own negligence. Any stipulation that
would annul this liability is void."
The decision would free the carrier
from all liability for damage. where
the net proceeds of the sale of the
damaged goods were not less than the
invoice price of those goods, plus the
freight, and if the whole cargo were
damaged equally, the carrier might
escape liability on the whole. Again,
the carrier might, under this decision,
appropriate to his own use a part of
all articles from which anything could
be abstracted without ruining the
whole, and escape liability in the
manner in which the Court has said
he shall not escape it.
The Court also said: "If the carrier
should be allowed in ascertaining the
amount for which he was liable to
charge against the invoice price of the
whole, the amount realized in a foreign
market for the whole cargo, damaged
and undamaged, that construction
would be giving to the carrier the full
benefit of the foreign market value,
which is expressly denied to the shipper, a result not presumably within
the intention of the parties." Now if
the carrier cannot compute his liability
in this way as to the whole cargo,
why should he be allowed to do it as
to the part damaged, by deducting
the net proceeds of damaged goods
-from their invoice value, plus the
-freight ?
The Court further held that its
ruling "only applies to damaged
goods carried to the port of destina.ion, the same rule that has long been
upplied in couits of admiralty to the
loss of goods at sea through collision,
namely, that the value at the port of
shipment and not at the port of destination shall control." In point of
fact, however, the decision has no
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such effect, but allows the carrier to
deduct the value of the damaged
goods at the port of destination from
the value of the same goods undamaged at the part of shipment, adding
only the freight.
The measure of damages adopted
by the Court in Pearse v. S. S. Co.,
is, however, not only inconsistent
with the doctrine of the case, but is
manifestly unjust. Where, by the
contract of shipment, the carrier becomes an insurer to a certain extent,
and under certain contingencies, it is
unjust that when those contingencies
occur he should, under any circumstances, be wholly free of liability.
Where freight proportionate to an
agreed value has been paid for the
safe carriage of goods, certain risks
only excepted, and the goods are
damaged by other than the excepted
causes, it is unjust that the shipper
should not recover some part of the
value for which it was agreed that
the carrier should be liable. A contract to carry safely goods of a certain
value, certain risks only excepted, in
consideration of freight proportionate to such value, is, as to all other
risks, precisely analogous to a valued
policy of insurance, and the measure
of damages for partial loss on such a
policy would seem to furnish the true

rule here. It has long been settled
that in such a case, whatever be the
actual value of the goods insured, the
proportion or percentage of loss is
determined, and the insurer pays the
same proportion or percentage of the
total sum for which the policy makes
him liable: Lewis v. Bucker, 2 Bur.
1167; Lunns v. Edwards, 12 East, 488 ;
Usher v. Noble, Id. 639, 646; Forbes
v. Aspinwall, 13 Id. 323 ; Goldsmid v.
Gillies, 4 Taunt. 803; Bonsfield v.
Barnes, 4 Camp. 228 ; Trving v. Afanning, 1 f. L. Cas. 289, 306; 1 Arnold's
Mar. Ins. (6th ed.) 300.
In The Lydian Monarch and Pearse
v. S. S. Co., therefore, the ratio of
the estimated loss or damage to the
whole value of the goods damaged
should have furnished the ratio of the
invoice value recoverable from the
carrier.
As has been already said, the principal case was rightly decided, if the
clause of limitation was rightly construed. If, on the other hand, as
would seem more likely, the limitation contemplated by the parties was
one of liability, not of damages, then
the measure of damages above suggested could have been applied with
justice to both parties.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNeT.

Philadelphia.

Supreme Court of Vermont.
WORTHEN v. LOVE.
The owner of a dog, known to be vicious, has the right to keep him if he
exercises proper care and diligence to secure him, so that he will not injure
ony one who does not unlawfully provoke or intermeddle with him.

from Rutland County Court.
Action on the case to recover for injuries resulting from the
bite of a dog. The Court assessed the damages at $30, but
ExcEPTIONS
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held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, and rendered judgment for the defendant.
J. C. Baker, for plaintiff.
.H. TV. Love, pro se.
Ross, J. On the facts found by the County Court, its judgment for the defendant was correct. The owner of a dog
known to be vicious has the right to keep him, if he exercises proper care and diligence to secure him, so that he will
not injure any one who does not unlawfully provoke or intermeddle with him. The Court has found that the defendant
knew the dogf was vicious, and kept him chained during the
daytime in his barn, and that he broke away and injured the
plaintiff, by reason of being unlawfully provoked by the plaintiff, who had no lawful occasion to go to the barn where the
dog was chained. Hence, the only question for consideration is,
whether the Court improperly excluded the offered testimony
of Eugene Alexander. The defendant had conceded that he
knew the vicious propensity and character of the dog, and that
ever since he had that knowledge, he had kept him securely
chained in his barn during the daytime, with the barn doors
opened, but left him unchained in the barn nights, with the barn
doors securely closed. This testimony tended to show that the
defendant had exercised due care and diligence in restraining
the dog, and that if he broke away on the occasion of the injury,
it was owing solely to the negligence or unlawful conduct of
the plaintiff in provoking the dog. The rejected testimony
of Alexander tended to show that the defendant did not keep
the dog securely chained during the daytime, but left him so
insecurely chained that, only a few days before the injury of
the plaintiff, the dog, when unprovoked, broke away from its
fastenings, and injured the witness's young daughter, when
passing on the street, and that this was known to the defendant. This offered. testimony bore directly upon the care and
diligence of the defendant in keeping the dog, and of his
knowledge that he was insecurely fastened. It also tended
to impeach the credibility of the defendant as a witness. It
was therefore admissible. The fact that the Court supposed
that it only bore upon the character of the dog and the defen-
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dant's knowledge of it, which had been conceded, did not,
without inquiry, or having the purpose for which the testimony was offered stated, authorize its rejection. Camp v.
Camp, 59 Vt. 67, is a recent and full authority on this point.
As it cannot be known what facts would have been found if
this testimony had been admitted, thejudgment must be reversed,
and cause remandedfor a new trial.
For the purpose of determining the
liability of the keeper of an animal
that has inflicted an injury, aside
from trespass on the soil, it is usual
with text-writers and Courts to divide
the brute creation in two classes: beasts
that are ferce naturm and those that are
domitce naturm. Of the keepers of the
former class of animals, it is said,
generally, that they are responsible,
either with or without notice of the vicious propensities of the animals kept,
for any injuries they may do : Earlv.
Iran Alstine, 8 Barb. 630 ; May v. Burdat, 9 Q. B. 101 ; Fan Lfu'en v. Lye,
1 N. Y. 515; Canefox v. Crenshaw, 24
Mo. 199; Congress 4- Empire Spring
Co. v. Edgar, infra; Scribnerv. Kelley,
38 Barb. 14; Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.
& F. 92; Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn.
121; 1 Hale P. C. 430, pt. 1, cl. 33;
Bull. N. P. 77; but of the keepers
of animals of the latter class, it is
said that they are liable for injuries
done only after notice of some vicious
habit or propensity of the animal
committing the injury: Applebee v.
Percy, 9 L. R. C. P. 647 ; State v. McDermott, 49 New Jersey Law, 163 ; Corliss
v. Smith, 53 Vt. 532; Murrayv. Young,
12 Buch. 337; Flamsbury v. Basin, 3
Ill. App. 531; Judge v. Cox, 1 Stark.
227; Charlwoodv. Greig, 3 C. & K. 46.
There are many things which it is
niot necessary to bring to the attention
of the Court by proof; of these it
takes official or judicial knowledge.
And the reason for this is, that the
facts are so generally known and re-

cognized within the limits of their
jurisdiction, as to leave no room for
any controversy about them, in the
minds of persons of the usual intelligence. To therefore require proof
of them would be a waste of time, to
no purpose, and cause suitors to incur
much expense: Reynolds on Ev. 66.
In pursuance of this rule, Courts will
take notice, without proof, of the usual
course of nature, of the seasons, of the
habits of animals, their propensities,
and of the probable effect of a transaction upon a man; of all such, proof
is unnecessary: Ross v. Boswell, 60
Ind. 235; Abel v. Alexander, 45 Id.
523.
But it is not the ownership of every
animal ferm natural, that renders the
ownerliable for injuries committed by
it, notwithstanding many of the expressions in the cases and books of authority which would lead one to the
contrary conclusion, were the language alone regarded, without examination of the facts of the particular
cases. Hale has stated the rule with respect to animalsfer naturowithmuch
clearness : "these things seem to be
agreeable to law: 1. If the owner has
notice of the quality of his beast,
and it doth anybody hurt, he is
chargeable with an action for it. 2.
Though he has no particular notice
that he did any such thing before, yet
if it be a beast that isfer naturce, as
a lion, a bear, a wolf, yea, an ape or
a monkey, if he get loose and do harm
to any person, the owner is liable to
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an action for the damage, and so I
knew it adjudged in Andrew Baker's
Case, whose child was bit by a monkey that broke its chain and got loose.
3. And, therefore, in case of such a
wild beast, or in case of a bull or cow
that doth damage, where the owner
knows of it, he must at his peril keep
him up safe from doing hurt. For
though he use diligence to keep him
up, if he escape and do harm the
owner is liable to answer damages :"
1 Hale P. C. 430, pt. 1, c. 33. So, in
an old case, it was said, that "there
is a difference between things ferce
nature, as lions, bears, etc., which a
man must keep at his peril, and beasts
that are mansuetme naturce, and break
through the tameness of their nature,
such as oxen and horses. In the
latter case, the owner must have
notice; in the former, an action lies
against the owner without notice:"
Rex v. Huggins, 2 Ld. Raym. 1583;
see Bull. N. P. 77. Both oftheseauthors speak of a whole class, "things
ferce naturce," yet the examples given
are ferocious beasts, lions, tigers,
wolves, and the like, which are wont
to destroy mankind or animals. In
order to hold the keeper liable for an
injury inflicted by such an animal, it
is not necessary to show that it is
fierce and dangerous; for the law
takes notice of such a fact and conclusively presumes that it is so: Muller
v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195; Lavarone
v. Mangianti,41 Cal. 138. Itcannot,
however, be presumed that a rabbit, or
a like animal is dangerous, and that the
keeper of it, aside from a trespass on
land, is liable for injuries inflicted by
it. Such an animal is neither dangerous nor mischievous; and of this,
the Court takes judicial notice. The
term fere nature, when applied to
those animals for whose injuries the
keeper is liable without notice of their
evil propensity, applies only to such

of this class as are ferocious or mischievous by nature, and not such as
are usually kept and are necessary
to the existence of men: Norris's
Peake, 486 ; 1 Chitty Pl. 82; Earl v.
Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630; Decker v.
Gammon, 44 Me. 322; S:ribnerv. Kelley,
38 Barb. 14 ; Besozzi v. Harris,1 F. &
F. 92; Smith v. Peah, 2 Stra. 1264;
Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109.
This statement is borne out by one of
the cases cited, wherein it was held
that bees, although in many respects
ferce naturce, are not such dangerous
insects as to render the keeper liable,
without actual notice of an evil propensity of those offending: Earl v.
Van Alstine, supra. Where a monkey
bit the plaintiff, the question was not
necessary to the decision, although
the Court was of the opinion that it
was such an animal as a keeper must
keep at his hazard: May v. Burdett,
9 Q. B. 101. In the caseof a stag running loose in a park to which the public resorted, it was held srfficient to
aver and prove the ferocity of the animal, and the defendant's knowledge
of that fact; and in proving its ferocity, experts were entitled to give
their opinions in evidence, touching
the propensity of the animal to commit an injury at the particular season
of the year the injury was inflicted:
The Congress 4- Empire Spring Co. v.
Edgar, 99 U. S. 645 ; s. c. infra.
It has already been stated that the
keeper of an animalferm naturce is liable, without any evidence of a knowledge on his part of its natural propensity, or proof of a scienter, as it is
termed: Applebee v. Percy, L. R. 9 C.
P. 647; s. c. 10 Moak, 334. "But
where the animal belongs to a class
which is not habitually ferocious, it is
necessary to show that its owner has
notice, that it has on former occasions
shown symptoms of a disposition to
bite mankind:" Id. Here the law
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takes notice of the usual propensity
of this class of animals, and acts upon
it accordingly; and it extends to the
owner the same privilege, allowing
him to act upon the presumption that
his animals of a domestic character
"will not break through the tameness
of their character," and commit an injury, unless he has knowledge of the
evil propensity in the offending animal. In all such cases, it is, therefore, necessary to allege and prove
notice of some kind at least, of the
disposition of the animal, in order to
hold its keeper liable: The Congress4EmpireSpring Co.v. Edgar,99U. S. 645;
s. c. 18 AmEEmCAN LAw REGisTER, 613 ;
Keightlingerv. Egan, 75 Ill. 141 ; Judge
v. Cox, 1 Stark. 227; Thomas v. Morgan, 26 M. & R. 496; Charlwood v.
Grezg, 3 C. & K. 46 ; Worth v. Gilling,
L. R. 2 C. P. 1; Hartley v. Harriman,
1 B. & A. 620; Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt.
9 ; Lynch v. MeNally, 7 Daly, 128 ; s.
c. on appeal, 73 N. Y. 347; Mason v.
Keeling, 12 Mod. 332 ; Logue v. Link,
4 E. D. Smith, 63; Smith v. Causey,
22 Ala. 568; Dearth v. Baker, 22Wis.
73; Earl v. Van Alstine, 8 Barb. 630;
Le Forest v. Tolman, 117 Mass. 109 ;
Popplewell v. Pierce, 10 Cush. 509;
Pressey v. Wirth, 3 Allen, 191; Cox v.
JBurbridge,13 C. B. (N. S.) 430; Fleeming v. Orr,29 E. C. L. & E. 16; Meibus v. Dodge, 38 Wis. 300; McCaskill
v. Elliot, 5 Strob. 196; Loomis v. Terry,
17 Wend. 496.
It has been said that the gist of an
action against the keeper of an animal which has inflicted an injury, is
the keeping of it after knowledge of its
mischievous propensities : 'May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 100; s. c. 10 Jur. 692;
16 L. J. (N. S.) Q. B. 64, approved
in The Congress 6- Empire Spring Co.
v. Edgar, supra; McCaskill v. Elliot,
5 Strob. 196. "It is frequently said
that the scienter is the gist of the
action, and it is true that no action
VoL. XXXVI.-82

can be maintained without it, but it is
equally true that no action can be
maintained with it alone. No law is
violated, nor any liability created by
securely keeping a ferocious animal,
with knowledge of its vicious disposition, but this knowledge imposes the
duty to keep it safely, and a neglect
to do this, coupled with an injury, creates the liability. No negligence is imputed without this knowledge, and
with it no liability is incurred without
negligence. If the owner of such animal, after notice of its previous disposition, neglects to keep it securely, and
any person is injured by it, he is prima
facie liable for the injury, without
proof of neglect in keeping such animal. He must keep it safely, or respond in damages for all injuries
inflicted by it, without the fault of the
person injured:" Williams v. Moray,
74 Ind. 25. In another case from the
same State it is said, that "whoever
keeps an animal accustomed to attack
or bite mankind, with knowledge of
its dangerous propensities, is prima
facie liable to an action for damages at
the suit of any person attacked or injured by the animal, without proof of
any negligence or fault in the securing or taking care of it. The gist of
the action is the keeping the animal
after knowledge of its mischievous disposition:" TDrtlow v. Haggarty, 35
Ind. 178. Under these two Indiana
cases it is necessary to allege that the
plaintiff was not guilty of negligence
contributing to the injury. But this
is not the rule of the English cases ;
for in one of them it is said, that "1the
conclusion to be drawn from an examination of all the authorities appears to us to be this, that a person
keeping a mischievous animal, with
knowledge ofits propensities, is bound
to keep it secure at his peril, and that
if he does mischief, negligenceis presumed;" May v. Burdett, 9 Ad. & E.L
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(N. S.) 101; Jackson v. Smithson, 15
M.&W. 563; Card v. Case, 5 C. B.
622; Hogan v. Sharpe, 7 C. & P. 755.
This language has been quoted with
approval by a New York Court,where,
after saying that a dog accustomed to
bite persons, is a public nuisance and
may be killed by any one when found
running at large, citing Putnam v.
Pagne, 13 John. 312; Brown v. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638, the Court quotes
from Hale: " He (the owner) must,
at his own peril, keep him up safe
from doing hurt, for though he use
diligence to keep him up, if he escape and do harm, the owner is liable
in damages :" fuller v. 3cKesson, 73
N. Y. 195. Elsewhere, it is said that
the owner, with knowledge of its propensity, keeps a vicious animal at his
peril: Kelly v. Tilton, 2 Abb. Ct. App.
Cas. 495 ; Wheeler v. Brant, 23 Barb.
324; Smith v. Peelah, 2 Str. 1264;
Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 496;
Woolfv. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 ; Blackman v. Simmons, 3 C. & P. 138; Rider
v. White, 65 N. Y. 54. It is therefore
held in the New York cases, that it is
not necessary to aver and prove that
the plaintiff has not been guilty of
negligence; and such is the great
weight of authority on this point:
Lynche v. McNally, 7 Daly, 130; s. c.
73 N. Y. 347; Smith v. Peelah, 2 Str.
1264; Brown v. Carpenter, 26 Vt. 638 ;
Mlarsh v. Jones, 21 Id. 378 ; Mc Caskill
v. Elliot, 5 Strob. 196. In one case it
is broadly said that the keeper of a ferocious dog insures the public that it
will not injure any one: McCaskillv.
Elliot, supra; and while this language
is not elsewhere used, the strictness
with which the owner of such an animal is usually held, almost warrants an
author in using it: see Congress4- Empire Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645;
s. c.18 AMERICAN LAW REGISTESR, 613.
The true principle seems, however, to
be to hold the owner or keeper ofa wild

and vicious animal, or of an animal
with knowledge of its evil propensity,
liable on the ground of a negligent
keeping of it. To keep a wild or vicious domesticated animal is not a
wrong per se; it is the failure to keep
it secure that renders the owner or
keeper liable, when coupled with an
injury. If the owner has used all the
usual precautions for the keeping of
such an animal, and is in no wise negligent in securing and keeping it so,
he should not be held liable. Perhaps
the fact that the animal was not secured when the injury occurred, is
sufficient evidence of negligence to
hold him liable, when the action is
based upon the ground of negligence,
unless the evidence reveals that the
defendant was in no way responsible
for its being loose. This is in consonance with a case where it was held
that the owner and keeper of a vicious
dog was not liable for an injury inflicted by it, when, unknown to him,
it had been improperly untied by another person : Fleeming v. On-, 2 Macq.
H. L. Cas. 14; s. c. 1 W. R. 339. See
Brooks v. Taylor, S. Ct. Mich., February 15, 1887.
A plaintiff maybe guilty of such negligence or wilful misconduct as to preclude his recovering for an injury inflicted by a wild or mischievous tame
animal. If one were to voluntarily or
carelessly thrust his hand into a bear's
mouth, he must suffer the consequence
unrecompensed. "Ifaperson with full
knowledge of the evil propensities ofan
animal, wantonly excites him, or voluntarily or unnecessarily puts himself in the way of such an animal, he
would be adjudged to have brought
the injury upon himself, and ought
not to be entitled to recover. In such
a case it cannot be said, in a legal
sense, that the keeping of the animal
which is the gravamen of the offence,
produced the injury. But as the
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owner is held to a rigorous rule of liability on account of the danger to human life and limb, by harboring and
keeping such animals, it follows that
he ought not to be relieved from it by
slight negligence or want of ordinary
care. To enable an owner of such an
animal to interpose this defence, acts
should be proved, with notice of the
character of the animal, which would
establish that the person injured
brought the calamity upon himself:"
Muller v. 2cKesson, supra. Inthe case
just cited, the defendants kept a Siberian bloodhound in the inclosed
yard surrounding their chemical factory, generally keeping it fastened in
daytime and loose at night, as aprotection against thieves. It was the
plaintiff's duty to open the gate to the
yard every morning to admit the workmen, and to do this he must pass
through the yard. On going to open
the gate one morning he was bitten by
the dog, which came up behind him
unknown to him, he supposing that
the engineer had tied him up as usual.
He made no examination to see if the
dog was tied. It was held that he
could recover, and that the rule of a
fellow servant's negligence preventing
a recovery did not apply. Where, in
such a case, the foreman, knowing
that the dog was loose, went into the
yard at night and was injured, recovery was refused: Brock v. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203. The plaintiff went
into a park thrown open to the public,
in which were several deer, including
a buck. Signs were set up, warning
-those in the park to beware of the
buck. She was attacked and injured
by it. It appeared that the park had
about eleven acres in it, and that the
plaintiff had frequently seen persons
playing with the deer. A recovery
was allowed: Congress - Empire Spring
Co. v. Edgar, supra. Even treading
upon a dog's tail accidentally is not

contributory negligence: Smith v. Pelah, 2 Stra. 1264. So, where the plaintiff was ascending the front steps of a
house to make a call, and a step broke
and let him through to where a large
and savage dog was chained, which
bit him, he was allowed to recover;
and it is to be remarked here that the
owner was not guilty of negligence in
the keeping of the animal, for if the
step had not broken, the dog could
not have reached the plaintiff. The
liability was put upon the ground, tacitly, that the keeper insured all that
the dog would not do any harm: Laverone v. hlangianti, 41 Cal. 138. In
Brooks v. Taylor, supra, it was held an
unnecessary allegation to allege that
the plaintiff was without fault: citing
Popplewell v. Pierce, 10 Cush. 509;
Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 130.
One may keep a watch-dog for the
protection of himself, his property,
and his premises. But if the dog be
fierce, he must do so cautiously. He
must confine him within reasonable
limitations. He has no more right to
turn a fierce dog loose in his dooryard at night, than to set a springgun therein. One is as much a nuisance as the other. Thus, where a
peddler, well acquainted in the neighborhood, who on previous occasions
had called at the defendant's house,
and had traded with his family,
visited the premises and knocked at
the door for admission, and supposing
he had permission, passed through an
entry into the sitting-room, there
meeting the defendant and his family,
and was severely bitten by a ferocious
dog belonging to the defendant, the
owner was held liable. The only
fault of the plaintiff was, that he had
entered the house under a mistaken
idea that he had permission so to do:
Woolfv. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121. Where
a savage dog is allowed by its keeper
to run at large, a trespasser upon
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the premises, who is bitten, may
recover: Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend.
496; Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58.
Where a child offered a dog candy
and the dog sprang at the child and
bit it, the owner was held liable :
Lynch v. McNally, 7 Daly, 130; s. c.
on appeal, 73 N. Y. 347. So, if one
approach a house by an entrance near
which a vicious dog is tied, it is no
defence that there were other entrances of a more public description:
Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 297.
If one by license goes upon ground,
and while there, invite another, who
is bitten by a watuh-dog, its keeper
is liable: Kelly v. Tilton, 3 Keyes,
263; s. c. 2 Ab. Dec. 495. See Curtis v. Mills, 5 C. & P. 489 ; Melbus v.
Dodge, 38 Wis. 300; Logue v. Link, 4
E. D. Smith, 63.
It has been elsewhere stated that
the owner or keeper must have had
knowledge of a domestic animal's propensity to do evil, before he can be
held liable. This fact of knowledge
must be averred and proven. Thus,
where a declaration alleged that the
defendant kept a fierce mongrel mastiff, which he improperly allowed to
be loose, and which had bitten the
plaintiff, a recovery was refused for
the lack of allegation that the defendant had notice of its bad qualities:
Mason v. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606;
s. c. 2 Mod. 332. So, the same was
held true in the case of a dog chasing sheep: Lutw. 119; Dyer, 25 b,
29 a; 1 Vin. Ab. 234; Card v. Case,
5 C. B. 622; Thomas v. Morgan, 2 C.
M. & R. 496; and where the defendant so negligently kept his horse
that it broke through and bit the defendant's mare: Scetchet v. Eltham,
Freem. 534, or that the defendant's
bull was accustomed to run at people,
and had injured the plaintiff: Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; Bayntine
v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90. In all these

cases, judgment was arrested. But
if it be alleged and proven that the
defendant knew the evil propensity
of his animal, he will be liable. As
where it was alleged that he knew it
was accustomed to bite sheep and it
bit the plaintiff's: Hartley v. Harriman, 1 B. & Al. 620; or where the
defendant kept a bear which he knew
was accustomed to bite animals, and
it bit the plaintiff's mare: Jenkins v.
Turner, 1 Ld. Raym. 109; or had a
dog, knowing it was accustomed to
bite mankind, and it bit the plaintiff:
Cropper v. Matthews, 2 Sid. 127 ; Charlwood v. Greig, 3 C. & K. 46; Smith v.
Pelah, 2 Str. 1264; Judge v. Cox, 1
Stark. 227; Jackson v. Smithson, 15
M. & W. 563; Woolf v. Chalker, 31
Conn. 121. And the same is true of
a bull attacking a man: Blackman v.
Simmons, 3 C. & P. 138; Hudson v.
Roberts, 6 Exch. 697; oradog worrying
cattle: Thomas v. Morgan, 2 C. M. &
R. 496; or a monkey accustomed to
bite mankind, and it bit the plaintiff:
May v. Burdett, 9 Q. B. 101. The
American cases are to the same effect:
State v. McDermott, S. Ct. N. J. November 10, 1886; Reynolds v. Hussey,
S. Ct. N. H. July 30, 1886; Oakes v.
Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347; s. c. 7 A xERI551;
GAx LAW REOISmTR (N. S.),
Williams v. Moray, 74 Ind. 25, 39;
Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121; Congress 4- Empire Spring Co. v. Edgar,
99 U. S. 645 ; s. c. 18 AMEaICAN LAW
REOISTER, 613.
In nearly all of the illustrations
previously given, the animal only followed a propensity it had previously
manifested to attack certain kinds of
animals; or to attack mankind and
Suppose the vicious
not animals.
animal never manifested a disposition
to attack mankind, but suddenly did
injure the plaintiff; or suddenly attacked an animal when it had only
shown a disposition to attack man-
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kind; or attacked one kind of animals when it had manifested a disposition only to attack another kind:
is its keeper liable? In an early
case, Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld. Raym.
109, it was alleged that the defendant
kept a boar which he knew bit animals, and which bit the plaintiff's
mare. It was argued in arrest of
judgment, that "animals" was too
general a term, and might include
frogs, etc., in which instance it would
be no offence to keep a boar; or even
though animals meant such animals
as sheep, yet the declaration should
have averred mares, for if a man
keep a dog accustomed to bite mares
and it afterwards bite a man, the
owner is not liable. But the Court
said that if a man knowingly keep a
dog accustomed to bite sheep, and it
bite a horse he is liable, notwithstanding the precedents; for the owner,
after knowledge of the first mischief,
ought to have destroyed him, or hindered him from doing any more hurt.
The Court also said that the declaration might have been bad on demurrer, but on motion in arrest itwas
good; for the defendant knew that no
evidence could be given if any mischief done by the boar except that
of which he had notice, and it must
be intended, after verdict, that evidence was given of its biting such
animals as sheep, and not dogs. But
the Court thought there might be a
difference between a boar and a dog,
for it is the nature of the latter to kill
animals ferm naturce, as hares, etc.;
but it is not natural to boars to kill
anything. In another case the charge
was that the defendant kept a dog
that he knew was accustomed to
worry sheep, and that it killed the
sheep of the plaintiff. The evidence
showed that the dog had bit men, but
there was no evidence showing that
it was accustomed to bite sheep. The

Court held that the plaintiff had tied
himself up in his declaration by
alleging a propensity in the dog to
bite sheep, and he must prove it, and
that there was no evidence to support
it; but if he had averred generally
that the dog was of a ferocious and
mischievous character, to the defendant's knowledge, that would have
been sufficient, without having a habit
to worry sheep: Hartley v. llarriman,
1 B. & Al. 620. If a bull injure a
horse, evidence of a previous attack
by the bull upon a man is competent: Cockerham v. Nixon, 11 Ired. L.
269. So, in Illinois, it has been held
that if a dog has a propensity to kill
one kind of animals, his owner is
liable if he kill another kind - Pickering v. Orange, 1 Scam. 338. But, in
a later case, it was held that proof
of a knowledge to bite other dogs and
animals, was not proof of a propensity to bite men, and that proof of the
biting of animals in an action for
biting the plaintiff was erroneous:
Keightlinger v. Egan, 65 Ill. 235. A
like rule was adopted in 'Maryland:
Twigg v. Ryland, 62 Md. 380; s. c.
24 A31ERICAN LAW REGISTER, 191.
If the animal has a mischievous
propensity, of which its owner has
knowledge, a previous actual violence
by it need not be proven or shown in
Whether or not
order to recover.
the owner or keeper had this knowledge, is a question for the jury: Congress 6- Empire Spring Co. v. Edgar,
99"U. S. 645; s. c. 18 ABIERICAN LAW
REGISTER, 613 ; Rider v. White, 65 N.
Y. 54; Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251.
So, where it was shown that the
owner had knowledge that his dog
was in the habit of biting people
when in play, this was held sufficient
to charge him with knowledge of its
tendency to bite when in anger:
State v. AcDermott, supra. ' And the
same was held true of a ram accus-
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tomed to butt: Oakes v. Spaulding, 40
Vt. 347; s. c. 7 AmERICAN LAw REGISTER, 551. A single previous instance

of having bit mankind is sufficient to
charge the keeper with knowledge of
its propensity, although it may never
have manifested any evil propensity,
before or since that time : Arnold v.
Norton, 25 Conn. 92; Judge v. Cox, 1
Stark. 227; Charlwood v. Greig, 3 C.
& K. 46. And the good conduct of
the dog, when one previous act of
viciousness has been shown, cannot be
proven in defence : Mann v. Weiand,
811 Pa. St. p.255 ; Buckley v. Leonard,
4 Denio, 500, unless there is a conflict
of testimony in regard to the particular
acts of viciousness, in which case the
general conduct and habits of the dog
may be considered in determining the
credit to be given to the witnesses:
M1ann v. Weiand, 81. Pa. St. 255.
Thus, in the case last cited, in an
action for scaring a horse, one instance of previous chasing was held
sufficient. So, where a horse kicked
through the front panel of an omnibus
and injured the plaintiff who was
riding in it, and there was no evidence
to show that this particular horse was
a kicker or mischievous, but it was
proven that the panel bore marks of
other kicks, and no precautions, such
as a kicking-strap, were used against
the possibility of the horse striking
out, and no explanation was offered
by the defendant, it was held that
there was proof sufficient to justify the
jury in reaching the conclusion that
the defendant had knowledge of the
animal's bad traits sufficient to render
him civilly liable, and that the Nisi
Prius Court did not err in refusing to
withdraw the case from the jury.
The language used by the Court is instructive: "Proof having been given
that the horse in question had misconducted himself in the way charged,
the burden of showing that he was

not habitually a kicker, or something
to account for his having kicked on
this particular occasion, lay on the defendants. The mere fact of his having
kicked out, was, I should say, prima
facie evidence for the jury. But there
was further evidence. It was proved
that there were marks of other kicks
on the omnibus besides that which
was made on the occasion in question.
It was left in doubt how those marks
were produced. It was impossible to
withdraw the evidence from the jury.
The defendants might, and ought to
have explained it. And when it is
said that all horses are prone to kick,
and that a single act of kicking may
be no fault in a horse, then it becomes
a fair question for the jury, whether,
that being so, it was not the duty of
the defendants to provide some means
to guard against such a contingency,
such as a kicking-strap or board. It
is urged that it is not usual for private
individuals to apply such contrivances
to their carriage-horses; but the answer to that is, that private individuals
generally take care to provide themselves with horses which do not kick.
Where a horse, from no assignable
cause, kicks out, I think the presumption is that he is a kicker. I think
there was clearly evidence for the
jury, and that the rule should be discharged:" Simson v. London General
Omnibus Co., L. R. 8 C. P. 390; s. c.
6 Moak, 173. A general report in
the neighborhood of viciousness is
admissible in evidence: Murray v.
Young, 12 Bush, 337.
Statements made after the injury is
inflicted are or are not admissible according to the extent of the admission
made by them. For instance, an
offer by the defendant to compensate
the plaintiff for his injuries is of little
or no value ; for the defendant may
see fit to pay rather than to run the
risk of a law-suit and its attendant
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expense and costs, if defeated. Unless accompanied by other facts, it
ought not to be received: Thomas v.
Morgan, 2 C. M. & R. 496; Beck v.
Dyson, 4 Comp. 198. In another case,
it appeared that the plaintiff was
walking in the street wearing a red
handkerchief. The bull of the defendant, ordinarily gentle and quiet,
and not known to have gored any
person previously, was driven along
the street, when he attacked and
gored the plaintiff. After the transaction, the defendant said that the
red handkerchief caused it, and that
he knew the bull would run at anything red. The bull had no hostile
feeling against the man injured, yet,
because of his mischievous propensity
to rush at a red object, of which his
owner knew, it was held that the
owner was liable, and that these
statements were admissible: Hudson
v. Roberts, 6 Exch. 697. See State v.
Dermott, supra. In this case, the
postfacto statements tended to show a
prior knowledge of the animal's evil
propensity. If it did not, it would
not be admissible: Cook v. Waring,
2 Hurl. & Colt. 332. See Rider v.
White, 65 N. Y. 54. Evidence of previous and subsequent viciousness is
admissible: Kennon v. Gilmer, 5 Mlont.
257; Todd v. inhabitants, etc., 8 Allen,
51; Maggi v. Cutts, 123 Mlass. 535;
Godeau v. Blood, 52 Vt. 251; Montgomery v. Kxster, 35 La. Ann. 1091.
The dog may be exhibited to the jury
to enable it to judge of his disposition:
Line v. Taylor, 3 F. & F. 731. (In
this case it was held a mere habit in a
dog of bounding upon and seizing persons, not so as to hurt or injure them,
though causing annoyance and trivial
damage to clothes, will not sustain an
action.) His subsequent bad conduct
is not sufficient to prove knowledge of
his conduct previous to the injury:
Fairchildv. Bentley, 30 Barb. 147.

If a dog has once, unprovoked, litten a man, in an action for a second
biting, even of another, it is no defence
that the dog was generally inoffensive:
Buckley v. Leonard, 4 Denio, 500.
The knowledge of an agent or servant, of an animal's ferocity, is sufficient to charge the principal or master
with notice of its evil propensity, if
the knowledge of such agent or servant be acquired within the scope of
his delegated power. Thus, if the
owner of a dog appoints a servant or
a coachman to keep it, the servant's
knowledge of the dog's ferocity is the
knowledge of the master: Baldwin v.
Casella, 21 W. R. 16; s. c. 3 Moak,
434; 16 L..J. (N. S.) 707; 41 L.J.
Exch. 167; 7 L. R. Exch. 41. In order to charge the owner with knowledge of the previous character of his
dog, which had bitten the plaintiff,
two persons who had previously been
attacked by it (one of them twice)
were called to prove that they had
gone to the defendant's public-house
and made complaint to two persons
behind the bar serving customers, and
that one of them had also complained
to the bar-maid. There was no evidence that these complaints were communicated to the defendant; nor was
it shown that the two men spoken to
had general charge and management
of the defendant's business, or had
care of the dog. It was held, by two
out of three judges, that there was
evidence of a scienter to go to the jury:
Appleby v. Percy, 9 L. H. C. P. 647.
In another case it was held that a corporation was not liable, althoughsome
of the servants knew of the dog's
habits: see Stiles v. Cardif Steam
Nav. Co., 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 310. Knowledge of the wife may be sufficient to
charge the husband, upon the presumption that she told him. Thus,
the defendant was a corn-dealer and a
milkman, and his wife occasionally
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assisted him in the business in his absence. A dog which was kept upon
the premises, where the business was
carried on, bit the plaintiff who lawfully went there. About four years
before, upon a single occasion, the dog
had bitten another person, and complaint was then made to the wife.
The Court held that this was sufficient
evidence of a scienter to go to the jury,
although the wife stated that she did
not remember the circumstance, and
had not communicated it to her husband: Gladman v. Johnson, 36 L. J. C.
P. 153. The converse of this proposition does not seem to be true: that is,
that notice to the husband, standing
alone, is notice to the wife to render
her liable: Miller v. Kimbray, L. J.
N. S. 360. But a scienter in the husband cannot be inferred from the wife
asking the daughter why she had not
tied the dog at the time the injury
was inflicted, although it will be inferred from proof of a tying up previous to the injury: Goode v. Martin,
57 Md. 606. So, if a servant, having
charge of a ferocious animal, neglect
his duty, the master is liable, even
though the master is a corporation:
Muller v. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195. So,
evidence tending to prove that servants, others than the one having the
dog in charge, knew of the evil habits
of the dog, is admissible to prove such
habits, and being admissible, the
Court will not presuihe that the jury
made an illegitimate use of it: Corliss
v. Smith, 53 Vt. 534; see Twigg v.
Ryland, 62 Md. 380; s. c. 24 AMERICAN
LAW RsEISTER, 191.

If the animal is the joint property
of two persons, one of whom allows
the other to have charge of it, both
are liable to the person injured: Oakes
v. Spaulding, 40 Vt. 347; s. c. 7AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 551.

So are part-

ners who keep a dog in their joint business : Adams v. Hall, 2 Vt. 9 ; Smit v.

Jaques, 6 Conn. 530. But where a statute made the owner or keeper liable,
a joint action for injuries committed
by two dogs was not allowed against
both owners, each one separately owning a dog: Buddington v. Shaerer, 20
Pick. 477; s. c. 22 Id. 427; Smith
v. Montgomery, 52 Me. 178. So, the
general rule is, that if the dogs of separate owners commit an injury together, a separate action against each
owner must be brought. "It does not
follow, because the animal of A. accompanies the animal of B. in the same
mischief, that the owners are jointly
liable. Where a joint action will lie,
either may be accountable for the
whole injury. In a case like the one
before us, the dog of one may be
young and feeble, and incapable of
mischief by himself: and yet, if a
joint action lay, his master might
be made accountable for the injury
caused by the large and ferocious dog
of his neighbor. The reason which
makes one liable who personally joins
in, or aids or abets the wrong done by
another, does not apply." Tran Steenburgh v. Tobias, 17 Wend. 562; Auchmuty v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495 ; Adams v.
Hall, 2 Vt. 9; Russellv. Tomlinson, 2
Conn. 206; Denny v. Carrell, 9 Ind.
72; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. 496;
Perry v. Phipps, 10 Ired. L. 259. So,
where it was proven that two dogs of
different owners killed sheep to the
value of nineteen dollars, and the verdict assessed to theowner of the larger
dog twelve dollars, it was held that he
had no reason to complain: Wilbur v.
Hubbard,35 Barb. 303. In the absence
of proof the law will presume that
each animal did the same amount of
damage : Partenheimerv. Van Osder, 20
Barb. 479 ; see McAdams v. Sutton, 24
Ohio St. 333; Flansburg v. Basin, 3
Ill. App. 531; Kerr v. O'Connor, 63
Pa. St. 341 ; Carroll v. Weiler, 4 T. &
C. (N. Y4 131: s. c. 1 Hun, 605.
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The owner is liable on the ground
that he has dominion and control over
the dog, and must restrain it at his
peril. But he need not have actual
custody of it. A father put his dog in
the hands of his son to keep it from
his creditors, and while there it bit
the plaintiff. The son was held liable.
"If, as between the defendant and his
father, the dog was the defendant's,
the father having surrendered his
right to defendant, and at the time the
plaintiff was bitten, the defendant had
a right to the control of the dog, and
he was only temporarily and casually
out of his actual custody, as anyone's
dog might be at a neighbor's house,
and the defendant's father, as between
them, had no right to any custody and
control of the dog, the defendant was
liable in this action; and that if the
defendant's father put the dog into
the defendant's hands for the purpose
of keeping him from being attached
by his creditors, it would not excuse
the defendant:" M-arsh v. Jones, 21
Vt. 378.
The harborer of a vicious animal is
as liable as the owner; for he has dominion over the dog. And the same
is true of one that allows it to resort
to his premises; 3fcKonev. Mood, 5 C.
& P. 1; Wilk-ison v. Parrott, 32 Cal.
102; Barrett v. 31alden, etc., R. R.
Co., 3 Allen, 101. But a dog may be
upon the premises temporarily, or in
the actual charge of another, and the
owner of the premises may in no way
harbor it; for he may have no control
over it. Thus, a boarder in a private
family may have a dog, and the owner
of the premises have no control of it;
in which case it would be manifestly
unjust to hold any other than the
boarder liable: Cummings v. Riley, 52
N. H. 368. So, where a passenger
was bitten at a railway station, while
lawfully there, by a stray dog which
had, shortly before, attacked another
VOL. XXXVI.-83

passenger, and a few minutes before
the injury complained of had been
kicked out of the signal box by one
of the employ~s of the company, it
was held not to be such a keeping of
the dog as would even justify the
leaving of the question of negligence
to the jury: Smith v. Great Eastern
Co., 36 L. J. (C. P.) 22; s. c. 15 L.
T. (N. S.) 246. So, where a hired
hand on a farm had a dog that followed him each day to his work and
returned at night with him to his
own home, which was separate and
apart from that of the employer, it
was held that the latter did not harbor it, and was not liable: Auchmuty
v. Ham, 1 Denio, 495. A statute subjected the" owner or keeper" of a dogkilling sheep to a liability without
notice of the dog's evil propensity.
The.defendant was charged as "possessed" of a dog, but the proof showed
that he only harbored it. Ie was
held not liable: Williamson v. Carroll,
1 Har. (N. J.) 217; Grant v. Ricker,
74 Me. 487 ; see Burnham v. Strother,
S. Ct. Mlich, June 23, 1887; Strang
v. Newlin, 38 How. Pr. 364.
If a master permit his servant to
keep a dog on the premises he will be
liable for its acts. In the case of the
farm hand, as has been stated, the
master was not liable; for the farm
hand was not strictly a servant within the meaning of that term. But
where a horse-railroad company permitted, tacitly, a person in their employ who had charge and superintendence of their stables, with the
knowledge and implied assent of their
general agent or superintendent, to
keep on their premises a dog that injured the plaintiff, it was held that
this was clearly sufficient to warrant
the jury in finding that the animal
was kept by the company: Barrett
v. Malden, etc., R. R. Co., 3 Allen,
101.
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A corporation may keep a dog; and owner alone; for one having charge
the instance just given is an example. of the pursued animal, or even a
Thus, where a passenger on a steam- stranger in a clear case, may stay
boat having gone to the company's the course of the offending animal by
premises to inquire about his bag- killing it if necessary: Leonard v.
gage, and finding them closed, was
Wilkins, 9 Johns. 233. And it is not
directed to inquire at other premises essential that the mischievous animal
of the company near by ; whither he be actually chasing at the time of the
went, and while there was bitten by killing; for if he manifest a disposithe company's dog, chained up around tion to begin or renew the pursuit,
an angle of the building, so as to be and the killing is necessary to propreviously out of sight of the passen- tect, it may be killed: Spray v. Amger ; to the knowledge of those in the merman, 66 Ill. 309 ; see Keck v. Halemploy of the company, but who had stead, Lut. 1494; Barringtonv. Turner,
no control over the premises, or au- 3 Lev. 28. If the owner of a ferocious
thority with respect to the dog, it had dog persist in letting it run about, and
bitten another person. It was held it is in the habit of viciously attacking
that, assuming the company to be mankind, such owner, it is said, would
aware of the dangerous character of be guilty of murder, if it were to kill
the dog, they were liable, and that any one: Jenkins v. Turner, 1 Ld.
in proving a scienter there is no dif- Raym. 109; Kittredge v. Elliott, 16
ference between a corporation and an N. H. 77; Blackman v. Simmons, 3
individual; whatever is notice to a C. & P. 138.
There are many experson competent to receive it, is no- pressions to the effect that a large
tice to the corporation. But in this and ferocious dog running at large is
instance it was held that no sufficient a nuisance, and may be killed by any
scienter was proven : Stiles v. CardifT one: Dunlap v. Snyder, 17 Barb. 566;
Steam Nv. Co., 33 L. J. (Q. B.) 310; Hinckley v. Emerson, 4 Cow. 351, with10 Jur. (N. S.) 1199.
out it being done in necessary self-deOne may not indiscriminately kill fence: Brown v. Carpenter,26 Vt. 638;
a mischievous animal, even though at Shefey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed, 58; King
the time it be engaged in mischief. v. Kline, 6 Pa. St. 318 ; Blair v. ForeThus a hog pursuing a chicken may hand, 100 Mass. 141. But in all such
not be killed to save the chicken ; for cases, the ferocity must be unusual,
the injury causing the death of the and not mere viciousness; and the
hog is out of all proportion to the loss killing must be done by one having
of the chicken: Morse v. Nixon, 6 a knowledge of its ferocity, for one
Jones, 293; Anderson v. Smith, 7 Il.
wantonly killing a dog of whose feApp. 354. But, on the other hand, rocity he had no knowledge could
if the animal pursued is of consider- not be justified by reason of his afterable value, the rule is different. As acquired knowledge: Brent v. Kimwhere a jack pursued a cow, and after ball, 60 Ill. 211. But one may kill a
throwing it down, was about to jump dog assailing him, although he, to
upon it, the owner was held justifi- the slayer's knowledge, has always
able in killing the jack to save the been quiet: Reynolds v. Phillips, 13
cow: Williams v. Dixon, 65 N. C. Ill. App. 557; Cornelius v. Grant, 7
416. And the rule that the owner of Scotch Sess. Cas. 4th ser. Just. 13.
the animal charged, may kill the pur- One may not kill a dog on its ownsuing animal, is not limited to such er's premises on the pretence that he
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is a nuisance or because lie has on a
former occasion bitten another person: McCaskill v. Elliot, 5 Strob. L.
196; Perry v. Pldpps, 10 Ired. L. 259.
"But it would be monstrous to
require exemption from all fault, as
a condition of existence. That the
plaintiff's dog on one occasion stole
an egg, and afterwards snapped at
the heel of the man who had hotly
pursued him, flagrante delicto; that
on another occasion he barked at the
doctor's horse ; and that he was
shrewdly suspected in early life to
have worried sheep, make up a catalogue of offences not very numerous
nor of a very heinous character. If
such deflections as these from strict
propriety be sufficient to give a dog
a bad name and kill him, the entire
race of those faithful and useful animals might be rightfully extirpated:"
State v. Holder, 81 N. C. 527. Where
a defendant justified shooting a dog

because it was worrying his fowl, and
could not be otherwise prevented, it
was held that he must prove that the
dog was in the act of worrying the
fowl at the very moment he was shot:
Jahson v. Brown, 1 Campb. 41. And
the owner of sheep was held not justified in killing a dog for worrying his
sheep after he had left them and
passed into another field:
Vells v.
Head, 4 C. & P. 568. Where the defendant was passing the house of the
owner of the dog, and it ran out and
bit his gaiter, and on his turning
around and raising his gun, it ran
away and he shot it as it was running from him, he was held not justified in the act, for the killing was
not done in self-defence: Morris v.
Nugent, 7 C. & P. 572; Hanway v.
Boudtbee, 4 C. & P. 350; s. c. 1 M.
& Rob. 15.
W. W. TnoaToN.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of Kansas.
STATE v. MOWRY.
An insane, uncontrollable impulse, is not sufficient to destroy the criminal
responsibility of the accused, when he knows the nature and consequences of
the particular acts charged against him, and that they are wrong.
Where a person is charged with having committed murder in the first degree whilst intoxicated, the jury may take his intoxication into consideration,
not as an excuse, but in determining whether he was capable of that premeditation and intent to kill which are the necessary elements of the crime.
It is murder for a person to kill one who he knows is pursuing him for a
felony which he has just committed.
APPEAL

from the District Court of Cowley County.,

S. B. Bradford, Atty.-General, and C. L. Swarts, for the
State.
Jennings J. T'oup and Irin Taylor, for the appellant.
JoHNsTON, J. (October 8, 1887).-At the April Term, 1886,

of the District Court of Cowley County, Henry Mowry was
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prosecuted and convicted for the murder of James P. Smith.
He seeks a reversal, on the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and supposed errors in charging the jury. It is conceded that he shot and killed Smith on the afternoon of April
21, 1886; but he defended on the ground that he was insane
and irresponsible. There is testimony, that in December,
1884, he began boarding at the house of 0. F. Godfrey, his
partner in business, whose family consisted of himself, his
wife, and two children. While boarding there he became
enamored with Mrs. Godfrey, and'frequently declared his
love for her. She listened to his protestations of love for
some time without informing her husband, but later she discouraged his attentions, and requested him to remain away
from the house. He then became moody and morose, and
declared that it was more than he could bear to be separated
from her. About this time he had an interview with his
mother, who testifies that he was then in great distress of
mind because of the cold treatment received from Mrs. Godfrey. He declared his affiction for her, stating that she had
encouraged his attentions at first, and that he had had illicit
connection with her, and was the father of her infant child,
but that now she repulsed him, and he begged his mother to
intercede with Mrs. Godfrey to allow him to continue his
visits at her house. On the morning of August 21, 1885, the
day that Smith was killed, he called on Mrs. Godfrey, and
again begged her to renew her former relations with him;
but she refused, and stated that she would inform Mr. Godfrey of his conduct towards her. He then asked if anything
occurred by which she should be without home, friends, or
money, she would call upon him, and inquired if she would
marry him in case anything should happen to Mr. Godfrey.
She told him she would not, and he said, "That settles it: we
can't be friends any longer ;" and left the house. Later in
the day he returned to the house, and found Mrs. Godfrey
alone, when he demanded to know whether she intended to
tell Mr. Godfrey upon him as she had threatened to do. She
informed him that she would, and he replied that he would
just as soon shoot her, and he thought he would do it before
night. He had a shotgun with him, and during the parley,
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pointed it at her. She ordered him to leave the house, saying
that she would call her son Frank and send him for her husband, and she followed him out of the house and did call her
son and directed him to go and bring his father. After
leaving the house he met .Mr. Godfrey, and informed him
that he had had trouble with his wife, and that she had a
story to tell him ; to go down to the house and hear it; and he
asked him if he would promise to come back and hear his
side of the story. This was agreed to by Mr. Godfrey, who
immediately went to the house and had an interview with his
wife, and returned to the hotel, where he again met Mowry.
MHowry inquired if Mrs. Godfrey had told her story, and
Mr. Godfrey replied that she had, and informed him that he
could not come to the house again. Mowry then insisted
that he should listen to his story, stating to Godfrey that the
youngest child was his, and that he was going to have it;
that he would spend every dollar he had on earth, but what
he would ruin the family or have that child. Godfrey left
him at once and returned to his home, and had been there
but a short time when he discovered Mowry coming towards
the house with a shotgun in his hand. Godfrey immediately
took his gun and went to the front door, and as Mowry
started through the gate towards the house, he ordered him
to go. Mowry said, "I don't have to," and stepped back in
the street. At this time Mrs. Godfrey ran in front of her
husband, who pushed her aside, and Mowry then raised his
gun and fired two shots through a window in that part of
the house to which Mrs. Godfrey had been pushed. M~rs.
Godfrey ran and called some workmen who were engaged
upon a building near by for help. Mowry immediately
started away from the house, reloading his gun as he went.
He was pursued by a large number of persons who were in
the vicinity. Smith, the deceased, w:as in the lead of those
in pursuit of Mowry, and gained on him as they ran. When
Smith came up withini about fifteen feet, Mowry turned with
his gun and ordered Smith to halt, which he momentarily
did. Iowry ran on again, followed by Smith, when he
turned, brought his gun up, and halted Smith a second time.
There was only a brief halt, for Mowry made another dash to
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escape, but was still pursued by Smith, who was closing in on
him, when Mowry turned, and a third time ordered him to
stop, and almost at the same time fired at Smith, discharging
a load of shot into his face and neck. Some one near by came
up where Smith fell, and the only words he was heard to
utter were, "Catch that man," and he died within a few
minutes after he was shot. Mowry was pursued until he was
captured, but not until he had shot another of his pursuers.
There is testimony that, after his capture, he stated that he
shot at Mrs. Godfrey, and supposed he had killed her; and
further, when told that he had killed Smith, he said that he
was sorry he shot him; that he had told him three times to
stop and he would not do it, when he shot him; and that he
would do the same thing again.
It is insisted by counsel for the appellant that his conduct
towards Mrs. Godfrey, and his acts immediately before and
after the homicide, are evidence of insanity. They offered
testimony tending to show that he acted differently about the
time of the homicide than he had before in this , that he was
moody and morose, restless at night, and absent-minded in the
day-time, complaining of pain in his head, and on several
occasions becoming excited when he would yell, cry, laugh,

and sob by turns, breaking furniture, and threatening to
injure and kill those who were his friends. And that these
and other incidents, all of which have not been mentioned,
show unsoundness of mind. Some of the medical experts expressed the opinion that a person acting in the manner in
which Mowry was represented to have acted must have been
insane, and some of them characterized it as an epileptic
mania. On the other side it is insisted that there was a complete failure to support the plea of insanity ; that his conduct
showed an infatuation, illicit, and without hope; that when
he was repulsed by Mrs. Godfrey, he schemed to separate her
from her husband by telling him that she was unfaithful to
him, and that he was not the father of the infant child, and
also by threatening to ruin the family if the child was not
given up, and that his purpose was further disclosed when he
asked her to be his wife in case of Godfrey's death. There
is testimony that he purchased a bottle of liquor shortly
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before the shooting, and several of the witnesses say that he
appeared to be drinking and drunk upon that day. It is
claimed that partial intoxication accounts for some of his
strange and unusual actions, and that, when his relations with
Mrs. Godfrey had been exposed, and he had failed to intimidate Godfrey and cause him to part from his wife, he then
drank liquor to nerve him for what he was about to undertake, deliberately secured a gun, loaded it, and provided himself with ammunition, and called at Godfrey's house for the
purpose of killing Mrs. Godfrey, and sought to carry out
that purpose by shooting into the room where he supposed
her to be.
We will not undertake, nor is it necessary, to give a detailed statement of the mass of testimony which was taken
in the case. We have examined it carefully, and we readily
reach the conclusion that the verdict of the jury ought not
to be disturbed. There is much in the testimony showing
design, and intelligent efforts to accomplish it. His consciousness of guilt, his fear and efforts to escape after committing
the felony at Godfrey's house, his coolness and deliberation in
three times halting his pursuer, and in firing the fatal shot,
and his subsequent recollection of all that transpired during
his flight and capture make an exceedingly strong case showinig responsibility, and it is difficult to see how the jury could
have reached a different result.
There is an objection made to an instruction, wherein the
Court states the test of responsibility in a prosecution where
insanity is asserted as a defence. The Court directed the jury
that "if he was laboring under such a defect of reason from
disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know that what he was doing was wrong, then the law does
not hold him responsible for his act. Oa the other hand, if
he was capable of understanding what he was doing, and bad
the power to know that his act was wrong, then the law will
hold him criminally responsible for it.

*

*

*

If this

power of discrimination exists he will not be exempted from
punishment because he may be a person of weak intellect, or
one whose moral perceptions are blunted or illy developed, or
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because his mind may be depressed or distracted from brooding over misfortunes or disappointment, or because be may be
wrougkt up to the most intense mental excitement from sentiments of jealousy, anger, or revenge.

*

*

*

The law

recognizes no form of insanity, although the mental faculties
may be disordered or deranged, which will furnish one immunity from punishment for an act declared by law to be
criminal, so long as the person committing the act had the
capacity to know what he was doing, and the power to know
that his act was wrong." We think the Court stated the
correct rule of responsibility where insanity is asserted as a
defence. The "right and wrong test" was approved by this
Court in State v. Xixon, 32 Kau. 205. It is there said that
"where a person, at the time of the commission of an alleged
crime, has sufficient mental capacity to understand the nature
and quality of the particular act or acts constituting the
crime, and the mental capacity to know whether they are
right or wrong, lie is generally respunsible if he commits
such act or acts, whatever may be his capacity in other particulars; but if he does not possess this degree of capacity,
then he is not so responsible." This test has received the almost universal sanction of the Courts of this country: Lawson, Insan. 231-270.
The defendant urges that the instruction is erroneous,
because it excluded the theory of an irresistible impulse or
moral insanity. This question received the attention of the
Court, and was practically decided in State v. .Nixon, supra,
although the question was not fairly presented in that case.
It is there recognized as a dangerous doctrine, to sustain
which would jeopardize the interests of society and the
security of life. Mr. Justice VALFNTINE says that "it is
possible that an insane, uncontrollable impulse is sometimes
sufficient to destroy criminal responsibility, but this is probably so bnly when it destroys the power of the accused to
comprehend rationally the nature, character, and the consequences of the particular act or acts charged against him, and
not where the accused still has the power of knowing the
character of the particular act or acts, and that they are
wrong." Further along he says that " the law will hardly
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recognize the theory that any uncontrollable impulse may so
take possession of a man's fitculties and powers as to compel
him to do what he knows to be wrong and a crime, and
thereby relieve him from all criminal responsibility. Whenever a man understands the nature and character of an act,
and knows that it is wrong, it would seem that lie ought to
be held legally responsible for the commission of it, if in fact
he does commit it." In a very recent case the Supreme Court
of Missouri considered the refusal of the trial Court to charge
that, if the defendant obeyed au uncontrollable impulse
springing from an insane delusion, he should be acquitted.
The Coum't repudiated that doctrine, and Judge SHERWOOD remarked, in deciding the case, that "it will be a sad day for

this State when uncontrollable impulse shall dictate a rule of
action to our Courts :" State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300. It is true
that a few of the Courts have adopted this principle, but by
fhr the greater number have disapproved of it, and have
adopted the test wlich was given in the present case: Lawson, Insan. 270, 308.
The Court was requested to instruct that, if there was a
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was intoxicated
or insane at the time the offence was committed, there -must
be an acquittal. This request was properly refused. Insanity
is a defence, and upon that question the jury were correctly
cliar'ged ; but a reasonable doubt of the defendant's intoxication, or even if his drunkenness at the time was undoubted,
it would not necessarily exempt him from legal responsibility.
While voluntary intoxication is no excuse for crime, yet
-where the crime charged is murder in the first degree, which
involves the condition of the mind when the act was committed, drunkenness may be considered by the jury in determining whether there was that deliberation, premeditation,
and intent to kill necessary to constitute the offence. This
principle was fairly stated to the jury, and the elements of
the crime charged, together with the doctrine of reasonable
doubt, were fully placed before the jury.
Complaint is made of a charge of the Court relating to
arrest. On this subject the Court instructed that, "where a
felony has been recently committed by any person, and a
VOL. XXXVIL-84
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private citizen has reasonable cause to suspect that such person is guilty of its commission, the law authorizes such private
citizen, while acting in good faith, to arrest the person who
has committed the felony in order to prevent his escape, and
in so doing he may use such personal force as appears necessary, under the circumstances, to effect the arrest; and, in
such case, if the person whose arrest is attempted has reasonable grounds for believing that is the actual intention of the
person attempting the arrest, and his motives foir so doing, lie
would not be justifiable in law in resisting the arrest." This
instruction is correct, and applicable to the facts in the case.
Alowry had committed a felony and was instantly pursued by
the deceased in an endeavor to arrest him. The deceased was
pursuing him in a temperate and proper manner, without
arms and without violence, to make the arrest. He had the
right to make the arrest in this manner without a warrant,
and hence the request for al instruction upon the subject of
a void and illegal arrest was properly refused, and the argument of the appellant upon that question does not apply.
Neither is there any force in the objection that the testimony fails to show that Mowry was not notified nor aware
of the purpose of the deceased in pursuing him. Notice is
only required to give the person an opportunity to desist from
flight and unlawful action, and to peaceably surrender. If
he necessarily knows the purpose of the pursuit and attempted
arrest no notice is needed. It is murder for a person to kill
one who he knows is pursuing him for a felony which he has
just committed ; and it has been said that "where a party
has been apprehended in the commission of a felony, or on
fresh pursuit, notice of the crime is not necessary, because he
must know the reason why he is apprehended:" Whart.
Crim. Law, 418.
The further objection is made that the Court failed to
charge the jury upon the law of all the degrees of the crime
of homicide inferior to and included in the one charged.
The jury were instructed on the law of murder in the first
and second degrees, and also upon the law of the third and
fourth degrees of manslaughter. There was no testimony
tending to show that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter
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in either the first or second degree; and, therefore, no instruction on those degrees was required or proper. The instructions
shifuld conform to the testimony of the case. If there is
slight evidence even that the defendant may have committed
a degree of the offeince inferior to and included in the one
charged, the law of such inferior degree ought to be given,
but should never be given upon a degree of the oflence which
the evidence does not tend to prove., An instruction upon
either the first or second degrees of manslaughter would not
have been wholly inapplicable to the facts in the case, and
might have confused and misled the jury. The action of
the Court in this respect was not erroneous: State v. liize,
36 Kan. 187; State v. Rhea, 25 Id. 576 ; State v. Hendricks,
32 Id. 566.
There are other exceptions to the charge, none of which are
regarded to be material, and examination of the entire record
satisfies us that the case was thirly tried, and that no sufficient
ground for a reversal exists.
The judgment of the District Court will therefore be
affirmed. (All the justices concurring.)
It is an axiomatic rule of the law,
thoroughly grounded upon public policy, that voluntary intoxication furnishes no excuse for crime committed
under its influence, even if the intoxication is so extreme as to make the
author of the crime unconscious of
what lie is doing, or to create a temporary insanity. There is a host of
authorities affirming this proposition:
Upstone v. People, 109 Ill. 169 ; Rqfferty v. People, 66 Id. 118; 31cintyre
v. People, 38 Id. 514; Marshall v.
State, 59 Ga. 154; Golden v. State, 25
Id. 527: Mercer v. State, 17 Id. 146 ;
lanrey v. State, 68 Id. 612; Ilenry v.
State, 33 Id. 441; Choice v. State, 31
Id. 424; Estes v. State, 55 Ga. 31; U.
S. v. Clarke, 2 Cranch (C. C.), 158; U.
S. v. Drew, 5 Mason (C. C.), 28; U. S.
v. McGlue, 1 Curt. (C. C.) 1 ; Respublica v. I1rcidle, 2 Dall. 88; Conaon-

wealth v. IIawkins, 3 Gray (Mass.), 464;
Comnmonwealth v. Malone, 114 Mass.
295 ; People v. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.)
566; People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9 ;
-ennyv. People, 31 Id. 330; Flanigan
v. People, 86 Id. 554; State v. Paulk,
18 S. Car. 514; State v. .IcCants,
I Spear (S. C.), 364; State v. Stark,
1 Strob. (S. Car.) 479; Peoplev. Carbutt, 17 Mich. 19; Roberts v. People, 19 Id. 401; Tyra v. Conmmonwealth, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 1; Smith v. Corn,nonwealth, 1 Duvall (Ky.), 224; Golliher v. Comnmonwealth, 2 Id. 163; Krill
v. Commnonwealth, 5 Bush (Ky.), 362;
Curry v. Comnionwealth, 2 Id. 67;
Blimm v. Conanonwealth, 7 Id. 320;
Shannahan v. Cominonwealth, 8 Id. 463;
Scott v. State, 12 Tex. App. 31 ; Carter v. State, 12 Id. 500; Jeffries v.
State, 9 Tex. App. 598; Outlaw v.
State, 35 Tex. 481; Colbath v. State,
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2 Tex. App. 391; Ferrell v. State, 43
Tex. 503; Brown v. State, 4 Tex. App.
275; McCarty v. State, Id. 461; Wenz
v. State, 1 Id. 36; State v. Dearing, 65
Mo. 530; State v. Sneed, 88 Id. 138;
State v. Harlow, 21 Id. 446; Vhitney
v. State, 8 Id. 165 ; Scholler v. State,
14 Id. 502; State v. Lowe, S. Ct. Mo.
November 28, 1887; Reed v. Harper,
25 Iowa, 87; Williams v. State, 81 Ala.
1; State v. Bullock, 13 Id. 413 ; Ford
v. State, 71 Id. 385; Tidwell v. State,
70 Id. 33; Mlooney v. State, 33 Id.419;
State v. John, 8 Ired. (N. Car.) 330;
Swan v. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 136;
Haile v. State, 11 Id. 154; Pirtle v.
State, 9 Id. 663; Cornwall v. State,
Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.) 147; Lancaster
v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 575; Clark
v State, 8Humph. (Tenn.) 671 ; Pennsylvania v. AlcFall, Addison (Pa.),
255; McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 102
Pa. St. 66; Kelly v. Commonwealth, 1
Grant Cas. (Pa.) 484; Jones v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. St. 403; Keenan v.
Commonwealth, 44 Id. 55 ; Commonwealth
v. Hart, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 546; Roswell
v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 860;
Commonwealth v. Jones, 1 Leigh (Va.),
598; State v. White, 14 Kan. 538; State
v. Mowry, supra; State v. Borne, 9
Kan. 119 ; Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 504;
Gillooley v. State, 58 Id. 82; Sanders
v. State, 94 Id. 147; Dawson v. State,
16 Id. 428; People v. Lewis, 36 Cal.
531 ; People v. King, 27 Id. 507 ; People v. Belencia, 21 Id. 544; People
v. Williams, 43 Id. 344; State v. Wdch,
21 Minn. 22; State v. Coleman, 27
La. Ann. 691 ; State v. Johnson, 41
Conn. 584; Casat v. State, 4G Ark.
511 ; Kelly v. State, 3 Sm. & M.(Miss.)
518; State v. Thompson, 12 Nevada,
140 ; People v. Odell, 1 Dak. Ter. 197 ;
Smith v. State, 4 Neb. 277; Hamilton
v. Granger, 5 H. & N. 40; Rex v.
Ayres, Russ. & Ry. 166; Rexv. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817 ; Rex v. Meakin, Id.
297; Reg. v. Gamlen, 1 Fost. & F. 90;

Burrow's Case, 1 Lewin, 75; Rennie's
Case, Id. 76; Pearson's Case, 2 Id.
144 ; Reg. v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463 ;
Reg. v. Monkhouse, 4 Id. 55; 1 Russ.
Cr. (9th ed.) 12; 1 Whart. Cr. L.
(8th ed.) § 51; 1 Bish. Cr. L. (6th
ed.) § 414.
"The third sort of dementia is that
which is dementia affectata, namely,
drunkenness. This vice doth deprive
men of the use of reason, and puts
many men into a perfect but temporary frenzy. * * * Such a person
shall have no privilege by this voluntary contracted madness, but shall
have the same judgment as if he were
in his right senses :" Hale, P. C. 32.
And in Beverley's Case, 4 Co. 123 b,
Lord COKE says, "Although he who
is drunk is for the time non compos mentis, yet this drunkenness does not extenuate his act as an offence, nor turn
to his avail; but it is a great offence
in itself, and therefore aggravates his
offence, and doth not derogate from
the act which he did during that time,
and that as well in cases touching his
life, his lands, his goods, as anything
that concerns him."
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duvall
(Ky.), 224, it was held that temporary
drunkenness may, in respect to responsibility, be treated as temporary
insanity; but this was repudiated in
Shannahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush
(Ky.), 463; see Wharton's Grim. L.
(9th ed.) § 49.
It makes no difference that a man
by constitutional infirmity, or by accidental injury to the head or brain, is
more liable to be maddened by liquor
than another man. If he has legal
memory and discretion when sober,
and voluntarily deprives himself of
reason, he is responsible for his acts
in that condition. But if a man is insane when sober, the fact that he increased the insanity by the superadded
excitement of liquor, does not thereby
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make himself responsible for his acts
in that condition: Choice v. State, 31
Ga. 424. And in Roberts v. People, 19
Mich. 401, it was held that if a person
be subject to a tendency to insanity,
of which he is ignorant, and which is
liable to be excited by intoxication,
and if in consequence of intoxication,
though voluntary, his mental faculties become excited to diseased action
to such an extent that he does not
know what he is doing or why he is
doing it; or if he is conscious of this,
lie is not conscious of any object in doing it, or if he does not know what he
is doing or that the means he is using
are adapted or likely to kill; or,
though conscious of all these, yet, if
the diseased action of his mind has so
far overcome or perverted his reason
that lie does not know what he is doing is wrong, then he will not be
held responsible for the intoxication
or its consequences. And in People v.
Cummins, 47 Mich. 335, it was held,
that where the defence of temporary
insanity proceeds upon the theory
that it was induced by the operation
of strong drink upon a mind rendered
unsound by an injury to the brain, it
is error to leave the question of criminal responsibility to be determined
upon the facts of injury and mental
unsoundness alone, or upon the effect
of intoxication, apart from the other
facts.
The reason for the doctrine.-Judge
COOLEY, in People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich.
19, states the ground upon which this
doctrine is held, quite strongly. He
says: "A doctrine like this, to wit,
that drunkenness should excuse,
would be a most alarming one to admit in the criminal jurisprudence of
the country, and we think that the
recorder was right in rejecting it. A
man who voluntarily puts himself in
condition to have no control of his actions, must be held to intend the con-

sequences. The safety of the community requires this rule. Intoxication is so easily counterfeited, and
since it is so often resorted to as a
means of nerving the person up to
the commission of some desperate act,
and is withal so inexcusable in itself,
that the law has never recognized it
as an excuse for crime." And in
People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, the Court
say: "It will occur to every mind
that such a principle is absolutely essential to the protection of life and
prop. rty. In the forum of conscience
there is no doubt considerable difference between a murder deliberately
planned and executed by a person of
unclouded intellect,'and the reckless
taking of life by one infuriated by intoxication ; but human laws are based
upon considerations of policy, and
look rather to the maintenance of personal security and social order, than
to an accurate discrimination as to
the moral qualities of individual
guilt. But there is, in truth, no injustice in holding a person responsible
for his acts committed in a state of
voluntary intoxication. It is a duty
which every one owes to his fellowmen and to society, to say nothing of
more solemn obligations, to preserve,
so far as lies in his own power, ,the
inestimable gift of reason. If it is
perverted or destroyed by fixed disease, though brought on by his own
vices, the law holds him not accountable. But if by a voluntary act he
temporarily casts off the restraints of
reason and conscience, no wrong is
done him if he is considered answerable for any injury which in that
state he may do to society."
The intoxication must be voluntary.If a person by the unskilfulness of
his physician, or by the contrivance
of his enemies, eat or drink such a
thing as causes frenzy, this puts him
in the same condition with any other
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frenzy, and equally excuses him:
Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. (N. Y.)
Russell on Crimes (5th ed.), 114. 266; Kenny v. People, 31 N. Y. 330;
See, also, Bishop Crim. Law, § 405, People v. Rogers, 18 Id. 9. It is only
citing Pearson's Case, 2 Lewin, 144;
of habitual insanity, when proved
1 Hale P. C. 32; People v. Robinson, 2 once to have existed, that the law enPark (N. Y.) C. C. 235; Choice v. tertains the presumption that it conState, 31 Ga. 424; Bartholomew v. tinues until the contrary is shown.
It is otherwise with spasmodic, temPeople, 104 Ill. 605.
Delirium tremens.-The rule that in- porary mania. So, when delirium
toxication creates no exemption from tremens is relied upon as a defence, it
criminal responsibility does not apply must be shown affirmatively that the
to delirium tremens, which, although accused was under the delirium at the
like many other kinds of mania the time of the act ; no presumption that
result of prior vicious indulgence, is he was so will arise from the fact that
always shunned rather than courted he had prior attacks of the same
by the patient, and is not voluntarily malady: State v. Sewell, 3 Jones
assumed, either as a cloak for guilt, (N. Car.) L. 245; State v. Reddick, 7
or to nerve the perpetrator to the com- Kan. 143; People v. Francis, 38 Cal.
mission of a crime. It is regarded as 183; 1 Arch. Crim. Prac. & Pl.
an insanity or diseased state of the (8th ed.) 29.
mind, which affects responsibility for
Where one's defence to the charge
crime in the same way as insanity of murder was temporary insanity,
produced from any other cause: MIa- caused by intoxicating liquors, and
conchey v. State, 5 Ohio St. 77; People known as "mania a potu" or delirium
tremens, the Court held that the
v. Williams, 43 Cal. 344; Bailey v.
State, 26 Ind. 422; Dawson v. State, charge to the jury need not use
either of these terms, nor define the
16 Id. 428; Fisherv. State, 64 Id. 435;
various types of insanity, provided
Cluck v. State, 40 Id. 263; Bradley v.
State, 31 Id. 492; Gates v. Meredith, the charge were sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the class of insan7 Id. 440; Erwin v. State, 10 Tex.
App. 700; Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. ity in question: Stuart v. State, 57
Tenn. 178.
149; State v. Hundley, 46 Mo. 414;
Insanity produced by drink.-Not only
Lanergan v. People, 50 Barb. (N. Y.)
does delirium tremens render a person
266; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401;
People v. Bell, 49 Cal. 485; U. S. v. irresponsible, but the mind may be
Drew, 5 Mason (C. C.) 28; U. S. v. overthrown and permanent insanity
Forbes, Crabbe, 558; U. S. v. Clarke, may be produced by long-continued
2 Cranch, 158; Cornwell v. State, habits of excessive drinking, without
Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.) 147; Carterv. any violent delirium tremens as the
State, 12 Tex. 500; U. S. v. icGlue, result: Bailey v. State, 26 Ind. 422;
1 Curtis, 1; Bales v. State, 3 W. Va. State v. Pike, 49 N. H. 399; 1 Arch.
685 ; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20 Crim. Prac. & Pl. (8th ed.) 29. In
U. S. v. Drew, 5 Mason, 28, Justice
Gratt. (Va.) 860 ; Bliss v. Conn. etc.
R. Co., 24 Vt. 424; Commonwealth v. STORY says: "The question made at
Green, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 289; Smith v. the bar is, whether insanity whose
remote cause is habitual drunkenness,
Commonwealth, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 224;
is or is not an excuse in a court of law
Tyra v. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. (Ky.)
for a homicide committed by the party
1 ; State v. M1cGonigal, 5 Harr. (Del.)
510 ; Rex v. Davis, 14 Cox C. C. 563 ; while so insane, but not at the time
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intoxicated or under the influence of
liquor. We are clearly of opinion
that insanity is a competent excuse in
such a case. In general, insanity is
an excuse for the commission of every
crime, because the party has not the
possession of that rea.-on which ineludes responsibility. An exception
is, when the crime is committed by
the party while in a lit of intoxication,
the law not pernutting a man to avail
himself of the excuse of his own gross
vice and misconduct to shelter himself
from the legal consequences of such
crime. But the crime must take place
and be the immediate result of the fit
of intoxication, and while it lasts;
an'l not, as in this case, a remote consequence superinduced by antecedent
exhaustion of the party arising from
gross and habitual drunkenness.
However criminal in a moral poin'
of view such indulgence is, and however justly a party may be responsible
for his acts arising from it to Almighty
God, human tribunals are generally
restricted from punishing them, since
they are not the acts of a reasonable
being. Had the cr:me been committed
while Drew was in a fit of intoxication, he would have been liable to
have been convicted of murder. As
he was not then intoxicated, but
merely insane from an abstinence
from liquor, lie cannot be pronounced
guilty of the offence. The law looks
to the immediate and not to the remote cause ; to the actual state of the
party and not to the causes which
lately produced it. Many species of
insanity arise remotely from what, in
a moral view, is a criminal neglect or
fault of the party, as from religious
melancholy, undue exposure, extravagant pride, ambition, etc. Yet such
insanity has always been deemed a
sufficient excuse for any crime done
under its influence.".
In charging the jury the Court said

(Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Yerg.
(Tenn.) 147): "If at the time the
homicide was committed the prisoner
had not sufficient understanding to
distinguish right from wrong, and
was in a Atate of insanity, it would
be excusable, but that must be
proved; if his insanity or bad conduct arose from drunkenness it was
no excuse. There may be cases where
insanity is produced by long-continued habits of intoxication; but it
must be a permanent insanity. Insanity which is the immediate effect
of intoxication is no excuse, the
party being fully responsible for all
his acts." A verdict of guilty upon
this charge was affirmed by the court
of appeal. The authorities support
this position without exception. See
cases cited to "delirium tremens,"
supra, and, also, Bradley v. State, 31
Ind. 492; Barrow's Case, 1 Lewin, 75;
Rennie's Case, Id. 76; Roberts v.
People, 19 Mich. 401; Upstone v.
People, 109 Ill. 169; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt (Va.), 860 ; Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554; Commonwealth v. Green, 1 Ash. (Pa.) 289;
Bennett v. State, Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.)
133; Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149;
Fisher v. State, 64 Ind. 435 ; State v.
Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713 ; State v.
Paulk, 18 S. Car. 514.
In Indiana it has been leld that
where the defendant's mind is so far
destroyed by a long-continued habit
of drunkenness as to render him mentally incompetent, intentionally and
knowingly to commit larceny, he
should be acquitted, although he was
intoxicated at the time he took the
property: Bailey v. State, 26 lId.
422. And in Upstone v. People, 109
Ill. 169, it was held that on the trial
of a defendant for murder, when insanity is set up in defence, and lie is
shown to have been intoxicated at the
time of the homicide, evidence of his
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previous intoxication will be properly
received from the prosecution, as
bearing upon the question of intoxication at the time of the killing and
of the conduct of the defendant while
in that state.
Dipsonania. The existence of a disease called dipsomania, which overmasters the will of its victim, and irresistibly compels him to drink to intoxication, is a question of fact for the jury :
State v. Pie, 49 N. H. 399. In this
case the Court say: " If there are any
diseases whose existence is so much a
matter of history and general knowledge, that the Court may properly
assume it in charging a jury, dipsomania, certainly, does not fall within
that class. The Court do not profess
to have the qualifications of medical
experts. Whether there is such a
ditease as dipsomania is a question of
science and fact, and not of law."
"We presume," says Bishop, Crim.
Law (7th ed.), 407, "that there are
Courts which will not not permit that
defence to be introduced ; but other
Courts have allowed it, and have held
that the questions whether there is
such a disease, and whether the act
was committed under its influence, are
not questions of law but of fact for the
jury. Still, looking at such an inquiry as a mere search after facts, it is
obvious that, to distinguish a case of
this sort from one of mere inordinate
appetite may be difficult, requiring
of judges and jurors great caution."
And see Pople v. Blake, 65 Cal. 275,
where it was held that evidence of
dipsomania is admissible for the defence, in a forgery case.
Dr n kenness as an aggravation. It
was formerly held that drunkenness
was an .mggravation, rather than an
excuse for crime: Beverly's Case, 4 Co.
123 t ; Pple
v. Porter, 2 Park. (N.
Y.) C. C. 14; Commonwealth v. Hart,

2 Brewst. (Pa.) 546.

But such is

clearly not now the law. In errell v.
State, 43 Tex. 503, it was said that
"1the Court below told the jury that
the condition of the defendant at the
time of the homicide, the result of intoxication, was an aggravation of the
offence, and should be so regarded by
the jury; thus, in effect, telling them
if the defendant was intoxicated, lie
might be properly convicted of a
higher grade of offence than the facts
otherwise required; for, it will be observed, it is the offence and not its
penalty, which the Court tells the
jury is aggravated by the appellant's
intoxication. It is needless for us to
say that the law of this State gives
no warrant for such doctrine. While
intoxication is no excuse, much less
justification for crime, it is certainly a
startling idea that the bare fact of one
being in this condition when the homicide is committed, converts nmurder in the second, to murder in the
first degree, or will authorize, if not
require, the jury to impose the penalty of death or confinement for life,
instead of a term of years.
This
would be directly the reverse of the
rule laid down by the Code, and would
make the fact that the homicide was
committed when the perpetrator was
incapable of a deliberate intention
and formed design to take life or do
other serious bodily injury for want
of a sedate mind, an aggravation instead of a mitigation of the heinousness of murder."
See, also, McIntyre
v. People, 38 Ill. 515 ; State v. Donovan,
61 Iowa, 369; U. S. v. Forbes, Crabbe,
559. The U. S. District Court (W. D.
Mo. Sept. T. 1882) in U. S. v. Claypool, 14 Fed. Rep. 127, held, that
when resorted to, to blunt the moral
responsibility, drunkenness heightens
the culpability of the offender.
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